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Abstract—Traditional network security protocols depend
mainly on developing cryptographic schemes and on using
biometric methods. These have led to several network security
protocols that are unbreakable based on difficulty of solving un-
tractable mathematical problems such as factoring large integers.
In this paper, Security of Networks Employing Encoding and
Decoding (SNEED) is developed to mitigate single and multiple
link attacks. Network coding and shared capacity among the
working paths are used to provide data protection and data
integrity against network attackers and eavesdroppers. SNEED
can be incorporated into various applications in on-demand TV,
satellite communications and multimedia security. Finally, It is
shown that SNEED can be implemented easily where there are k
edge disjoint paths between two core nodes (routers or switches)
in an enterprize network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Internet Traffic Engi-
neering (ITE) aim to provide fast, reliable, quality of demands,
and differentiated services for demanding users. Such services
can be deployed at the IP, physical, and application layers.
Several security schemes and network protection strategies
have been proposed during the last two decades to protect op-
erational networks against link failures, node attacks, increased
overhead and congestion. The goal in this paper is to provide
novel strategies for network security services against attacks
and eavesdroppers by deploying network coding and shared
capacity. The strategies can be deployed to protect network
traffics between core nodes such as routers or switches.
Protection of communication networks against network at-
tacks and failures are essential to increase robustness, reliabil-
ity, and availability of the transmitted data. The attacks may
also occur at various network layers, including the physical,
IP, or application layers [13], [16]–[18]. Also, network attacks
can occur due to vulnerable network configurations or due
to transmitting insecure data. These problems have received
significant attention from researchers and practitioners, and a
large number of techniques have been introduced to address
such problems. In the other side, traditional network security
schemes depend mainly on developing cryptographic protocols
or on using biometric methods. Essentially, cryptographic
protocols are considered unbreakable based on difficulty of
solving mathematical problems such as factoring large inte-
gers [17], [18].
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been recently
used to increase the throughput, capacity, and performance
of communication networks. Information theory aspects of
network coding have been investigated in [1], [7], [8] and [20].
It certainly can offer benefits in terms of energy efficiency,
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Fig. 1. n links are shared between sets of senders and receivers. One link
is used for data integrity and message authentication. The trusted party can
be a router (or switch) to send and receive messages.
additional security, and delay minimization. Network coding
is used to detect adversaries [10] and to protect packets against
network attackers and injectors [5], [9], [12]. Network coding
can be also used to enhance security and protection [12], [14].
In this paper, we propose an approach for light-weight
network security that is based on network coding. We develop
a scheme called SNEED, Security of Networks Employing
Encoding and Decoding, in order to protect transmitted data
between sets of senders and receivers. For one path that has
been attacked (eavesdropped) between a sender and receiver,
one backup path is provided, in which it will carry encoded
data from sources to receivers.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we describe the network model and basic
assumptions. The node can be a router, switch, or an end
terminal depending on the network model and transmission
layer.
A. Network Model
i) Let N be a network represented by an abstract graph
G = (V, E), where V is a set of nodes and E is
a set of undirected edges. Let S = {s1, s2, . . .} and
R = {r1, r2, . . .} be sets of independent sources and
destinations, respectively. The set V = V ∪S∪R contains
the relay nodes, sources, and destinations as shown in
Fig. 1. Assume for simplicity that |S| = |R| = n, and
hence the number of sources is equal to the number of
receivers. Assume also that the senders (receivers) are
connected by a super sender (receiver).
ii) A connection path Li is a set of edges connected to-
gether with a starting node (sender) and an ending node
2(receiver). The paths L = {L1, L2, . . .} carry data from
the sources to the receivers. Connection paths are link
disjoint and provisioned in the network between senders
and receivers. All connections have the same bandwidth,
or otherwise a connection with a high bandwidth can be
divided into multiple connections, each of which has the
unit capacity.
iii) Every sender si will send a message mℓi to the receiver
ri at time tℓδ in the round ℓ in the cycle δ, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. A receiver ri receiving a message mℓi is
able to detect whether the message has been altered by
using any authentication or signaling protocols. Further
details regarding this model, definition of the working and
backup paths, and the normalized capacity can be found
in [2] and [3].
iv) Enck and Deck represent the encryption and decryption
algorithms with a shared symmetric key k, respectively.
B. Senders and Receivers Packets
Every sender si prepares a packet packetsi→ri sent to the
receiver ri. The packet contains the sender’s IDsi , data mℓi ,
and time for every round and cycle tℓδ . There are four types
of packets that carry the data:
i) Plain Packets. Packets sent without network coding or
encryption, in which the sender does not require to per-
form any coding or encrypting operations. For example,
in case of packets sent without coding, the sender si sends
the following packet to the receiver ri:
packetsi→ri := (IDsi ,m
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ) (1)
ii) Encoded Packets. Packets sent with encoded data with-
out encryption, in which the sender requires to perform
other sender’s data. For example, in case of packets sent
with encoded data, the sender si sends the following
packet to receiver ri:
packetsi→ri := (IDsi ,
∑
sj∈S
mℓj , t
ℓ
δ), (2)
where S is the set of sources sending plain messages.
iii) Encrypted Packets. Assume there is a shared symmetric
key between a sender si and receiver ri. In this case the
sender si will send the packet packetsi→ri as follows:
packetsi→ri := (IDsi , Encki(m
ℓ
i), t
ℓ
δ). (3)
This packet carries an encrypted message without encod-
ing.
iv) Encoded and Encrypted Packets. Packets sent with
encoded data with encryption, in which the sender needs
to protect other senders’ data. For example, in case of
packets sent with encoded encrypted data, the sender si
sends the following packet to receiver ri:
packetsi→ri := (IDsi ,
∑
sj∈S
xℓj , t
ℓ
δ). (4)
The value yi =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i x
ℓ
j , where xℓj = Enckj (mℓj), is
computed by every sender si, in which it is able to collect
the data from all other senders and encode them by using
the XORed operations.
C. Attackers Model
We represent an attacker model as follows. There are
two types of attacks in which the network security services
must overcome: Active (intruders) and passive (eavesdroppers)
attackers [19]. We also assume that t different attackers have
access to t channels among all n channels L1, L2, . . . , Ln at
a certain round time, for t ≥ 1. This is similar to an attacker
accessing t channels. Multiple attackers which attack the same
channel are represented by one attacker.
i) The passive attacker is able to eavesdrop on the transmis-
sion between the senders and receivers. A passive attacker
such as an eavesdropper should not learn any information
even if it can have a copy of it.
ii) The active attacker can modify or fabricate messages
throughout a cycle. This occurs by injecting new data
(coefficients) at the relay nodes of data sent by the
sources. This can occur also over the shared links. In
addition, an active attacker will not be able to change or
fabricate information, and affect the system resources due
to the network security strategies.
This attacker model is similar to the attacker model de-
scribed for wiretapping channels as stated by many authors [6],
[20].
III. DATA SECURITY AGAINST A SINGLE ATTACKED PATH
BY USING SHARED KEYS AND NETWORK CODING
In this section, we consider the case of a single active
attacker, i.e., t = 1. We will assume that there are shared
symmetric keys between the senders and receivers. Also, the
receivers are able to detect messages that have been modified
by the attackers using hashing functions like MD5 or SHA-
1; fabricated messages can be detected by using sequence
numbers between the senders and receivers [17], [18].
Let ki be a shared symmetric key between si and ri. This
key can be distributed by using a Trusted Third Parity (TTP).
In this case, the senders exist in a secure domain as well as the
receivers. Let xi be the encrypted message from the sender si
to the receiver ri by using the shared key ki. Thus,
xℓi = Encki(m
ℓ
i) (5)
A. Encoding Operations: The encoding operations are done
as follows. At every round time, n − 1 senders will send
their own data with full capacity over n − 1 paths that are
established from the sources to the destinations. Also, these
n−1 sources will exchange their data with exactly one source
node si that will send the Xored encoded data over a shared
link Li. This process is explained in Eq. (6) in Table 1.; and
we call it (SNEED) against a single attacked path (SAP).
The data is sent in rounds for every cycle. Also, we assume
that the attacker can affect only one path throughout a cycle,
3TABLE I
THE ENCODING OPERATIONS OF SNEED
round time cycle 1 . . . . . .
1 2 3 . . . j . . . n . . . . . .
s1 → r1 y1 x
1
1
x2
1
. . . x
j
1
. . . x
n−1
1
. . . . . .
s2 → r2 x
1
2
y2 x
2
2
. . . x
j
2
. . . x
n−1
2
. . . . . .
s3 → r3 x
1
3
x2
3
y3 . . . x
j
3
. . . x
n−1
3
. . . . . .
.
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.
.
.
. . . . . . .
sj → rj x
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j
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j
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j
. . . yj . . . x
n−1
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. . . . . .
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.
.
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.
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.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . .
sn → rn x
1
n x
2
n x
3
n . . . x
j−1
n . . . yn . . . . . .
(6)
but different paths might suffer from different active attackers
throughout different cycles. In this case, throughout of one
cycle consists of n rounds, yj’s for 1 ≤ j ≤ n are defined
over F2 as
yj =
j−1∑
i=1
xj−1i ⊕
n∑
i=j+1
xji . (7)
The senders send packets to the set of receivers in rounds.
Every packet initiated from the sender si contains IDsi , data
xℓsi , and a round t
ℓ
δ . For example, the sender si will send the
encrypted packetsi−→ri as follows.
packetsi−→ri = (IDsi , x
ℓ
si
, tℓδ). (8)
Also, the sender sj will send the encoded encrypted data ysj
as
packetsj−→−→rj = (IDsj , ysj , t
ℓ
δ). (9)
We ensure that the encoded data ysj is varied per one round
transmission for every cycle. This means that the path Lj
is dedicated to send only one encoded data yj and all data
x1j , x
2
j , . . . , x
n−1
j .
The data transmitted from the sources do not experience any
round time delay. This means that the receivers will be able to
decrypt the received packets online and immediately recover
the attacked data. In Eq. (6), the active attacker can break only
one message per one attacked working path. A generalization
of this scheme is presented in Section V where the active
attacker(s) has access to t multiple channels simultaneously.
Lemma 1: The normalized network capacity according to
Eq. (6) is (n− 1)/n.
Proof: The proof comes from the fact that only one
encoded packet is sent over one channel throughout every
round per cycle. Therefore, there are (n − 1) plain packets
sent over n channels.
B. Decoding and Data Integrity Operations: The decoding
operations are done as follows. Every receiver ri will receive
a message xℓi over the link Li. Once the attack occurs at a link
Li, then the receiver that receives yℓ over the path Lℓ will be
used for data integrity and recovery.
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Fig. 2. n shared links between a set of senders and a set of receivers. One
link is used for data integrity and authentication. A path is a set of links
connecting a set of nodes (routers or switches). A software management to
solve a commodity problem can be used to provision a set of link disjoint
paths between two core nodes in a given network topology.
In case the attacker modifies the message, the receiver ri
will know about the modified message by using MD5 hashing
function, so ri will ask other receivers to send their messages
to recover the modified message.
xℓi = yj ⊕
n∑
h=1,h 6=i
xj−1h ⊕
n∑
h=j+1,h 6=i
xjh. (10)
The receiver ri will decrypt the message xℓi by using its
symmetric key ki, i.e., mℓi = decki(xℓi).
IV. SNEED WITHOUT SHARING SYMMETRIC KEYS
In this section, we propose to use network coding to secure
the traffic between the senders and receivers against active
attackers, where no symmetric keys are shared. Assume a
network with n connections shared between n senders and
receivers. We will assume that every sender will be able to
combine packets from other receivers to hide its own data.
For example, the sender si will send the encoded message yi
to the receiver ri over the link Li.
We will design a security scheme by using network coding
against an entity which can not only copy or listen to the
message, but also can fabricate new messages or modify the
current ones. In this model we do not assume pre-shared secret
keys between the senders and receivers. Also, the message is
still secured against attack’s fabrication and modification.
A. Network Security Codes and SNEED
We will define network security codes for SNEED and
study their properties. We assume there is a super sender
S that sends n different messages over disjoint paths to n
receivers as shown in Fig. 2. Furthermore, the receivers can
communicate with each other by using a trusted party. The
goal is to provide collaborative security for the n messages
against eavesdroppers, intruders, and malicious attackers. We
will develop SNEED over the binary field, hence the fastest
encoding and decoding operations are used.
One useful application of SNEED is the case of sending
multimedia and TV streams over a public network as in the
4TABLE II
BEST KNOWN SNEED CODES OVER F2 [11]
n m code type
7 3 [7, 4, 3]2 Hamming code
10 4 [10, 6, 3]2 Linear code
15 4 [15, 11, 3]2 Hamming code
19 7 [19, 12, 3]2 Extension construction
23 8 [23, 15, 3]2 Extension construction
25 5 [25, 20, 3]2 Linear code
31 5 [31, 26, 3]2 Hamming code
39 8 [39, 31, 3]2 Extension construction
47 9 [47, 38, 3]2 Extension construction
63 6 [63, 57, 3]2 Hamming code
71 8 [71, 63, 3]2 Matrix construction
79 9 [79, 70, 3]2 Extension construction
95 10 [95, 85, 3]2 Extension construction
127 7 [127, 120, 3]2 Hamming code
Internet. Such streams must be processed online with fast
encoding and decoding operations, in addition to the security
operations. Let d be the minimum distance defined as in the
notion of error correcting codes [4], [11], [15].
Definition 2 (SNEED): An [n, k, d]2 network security
code is a k-dimensional subspace of the space Fn2 that secures
k information symbols (messages) by mapping them into n
mixed symbols, and can recover from upto d−1 compromised
(attacked) channels. Furthermore, the code is generated by a
nonsystematic matrix G of size k × n defined over F2.
G =


g11 g12 . . . g1n
g21 g21 . . . g2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
gk1 gk2 . . . gkn


k×n
(11)
We will use the nonsystematic classical binary error cor-
recting codes in the construction of SNEED [11], [15]. The
encoding scheme of such codes is given by
L1 L2 · · · Ln
s1 g11m1 g12m1 . . . g1nm1
s2 g21m2 g22m2 . . . g2nm2
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
sk gk1mk gk2mk . . . gknmk
y1 y2 . . . yn
(12)
The encoding message yj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n , is defined by
yj =
k∑
i=1
gijmi (13)
Lemma 3: The normalized capacity of the network utiliz-
ing SNEED is given by k/n.
Proof: By the definition of the network security code,
there are n − k redundant symbols that are used to recover
from up to d − 1 attached channels. Therefore there are k
working paths that will carry k source data. The result is a
consequence by dividing by the total number of channels n.
Table II presents the best known SNEED for certain number
of channels defined over F2.
We have n−k lockers’ channels, in which they carry redun-
dant data, in this model. From the proposed code construction,
we ensure that t = d − 1 ≤ n − k, where t is the number
of compromised (attacked) channels. This is actually a direct
consequence of the Singleton bound [11], [15].
B. Decoding Operations of SNEED
The decoding operations at the receivers side are guaran-
teed once a system of t linearly independent equations is
established in t unknown variables. Let t attackers can access
t disjoint channels and alter the transmitted messages. We
assumed that the receivers are located in a trusted domain,
therefore they can trust and exchange protected messages with
each others.
The system can be solved by using, for example, Gauss
elimination method. By definition of SNEED, the matrix G
has dimension of k. Furthermore, the receivers will know the
number and position of the channels that have been attacked.
In this case the decoding operations are achieved by using the
well known decoding methods for erasure channels, see [11].
The following example illustrates the proposed model.
Example 4: Assume we have a connection Li between a
sender si and a receiver ri for i = 1, 2, 3 and 4. Furthermore,
the channel L4 is used as a lock (redundant) path. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that the four senders send
y1 = m1 ⊕m2
y2 = m2 ⊕m3
y3 = m1 ⊕m3
y4 = m1 ⊕m2 ⊕m3
(14)
We also assume that the attacker affects only one of channels
L1, L2 or L3. In this example the SNEED can be stated as
follows. There are three working paths and one lock path. The
security scheme is given by


1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
0 1 1 1


L1 L2 L3 L4
s1 m1 0 m1 m1
s2 m2 m2 0 m2
s3 0 m3 m3 m3
T y1 y2 y3 y4
(15)
If the channel L2 is compromised, then the decoding can be
done by using Gauss elimination method over the channels
L1, L3 and L4. Adding y1, y3 and y4 will give m1, then
substituting in y1 and y3 will give m2 and m3.
V. SNEED OVER HIGHER FINITE FIELDS
In this section, we study security of networks employing
encoding and decoding, SNEED, against multiple link attacks.
We propose SNEED over a finite field with q elements to
achieved this goal. In this scheme is an extension of the
5scheme presented in Section III, where the encoding and
decoding operations are defined over the binary field. Assume
t be the number of compromised channels. One can design a
matrix G over Fq such that k = n− t paths will carry secure
data. Let a be a primitive element in Fq . The matrix G is
defined by
G =


1 a a2 . . . an−1
1 a2 a4 . . . an−2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 ak a2k . . . akn

 (16)
The matrix G has rank k = n − t. Clearly a finite field
with q > n− t+1 is sufficient for the encoding and decoding
operations. The encoding operations are done by using the
following encoding scheme.
L1 L2 L3 · · · Ln
s1 x1 ax1 a
2x1 . . . a
1nx1
s2 x2 a
2x2 a
4x2 . . . a
2nx2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
sk xk a
kxk a
2kxk . . . a
knxk
T y1 y2 y3 . . . yn
(17)
By this construction, if there are up to t attacked paths, then
the system of n− t× n− t equations is solvable. This is due
to the fact that the remaining matrix can be reduced to the
Vandermond matrix [11, Chapter 4].
VI. CONCLUSION
Network coding as a promising tool offers benefits for
enhancement and supplement of network security services.
In this paper, we presented schemes for enhancing network
security using network coding and joint capacities. We demon-
strated the encoding and decoding operations of the proposed
SNEED and showed that it can be deployed over a network
with n senders and n receivers. Furthermore, SNEED is robust
against active and passive network attacks. Our future work
will include practical aspects of the proposed schemes.
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